-> It need to have a copy of the Rollup state in order to properly execute transactions correct ?
2. And another question, what would happen if the sequencer colludes with a proposer, withholds data and then the proposer publishes an invalid state root to the bridge ? This is concerning the bridge only not the Rollup itself. How could fraud be proved in this scenario ?
Either here or in a followup post I'd love to better understand:
- whether I should believe that the Arbitrum *delayed inbox* is a sound argument that Censorship Resistance is preseved
- how shared sequencing exposes options for trust-minimized bridges between rollup environments
- really off the wall, but if the above paradigm for trust-min is viable, whether it might be viable for rollups post data to multiple DA's just for wider trust-minimized bridge-ability with other chains
> whether I should believe that the Arbitrum *delayed inbox* is a sound argument that Censorship Resistance is preseved
CR is preserved only for order-independent (infallible) transactions. If the transaction can be invalidated or caused to revert by an action of the Sequencer, it is censorable regardless of whether it's in normal or forced-inclusion systems
> how shared sequencing exposes options for trust-minimized bridges between rollup environments
not too much. It may help users of those bridges by providing atomic inclusion guarantees. But it cannot be used to construct a bridge without some other system or trust assumption
> really off the wall, but if the above paradigm for trust-min is viable, whether it might be viable for rollups post data to multiple DA's just for wider trust-minimized bridge-ability with other chains
Why swaps or DeFi interactions are fallible transactions?
1. But a Sequencer never requires the state
-> It need to have a copy of the Rollup state in order to properly execute transactions correct ?
2. And another question, what would happen if the sequencer colludes with a proposer, withholds data and then the proposer publishes an invalid state root to the bridge ? This is concerning the bridge only not the Rollup itself. How could fraud be proved in this scenario ?
Either here or in a followup post I'd love to better understand:
- whether I should believe that the Arbitrum *delayed inbox* is a sound argument that Censorship Resistance is preseved
- how shared sequencing exposes options for trust-minimized bridges between rollup environments
- really off the wall, but if the above paradigm for trust-min is viable, whether it might be viable for rollups post data to multiple DA's just for wider trust-minimized bridge-ability with other chains
> whether I should believe that the Arbitrum *delayed inbox* is a sound argument that Censorship Resistance is preseved
CR is preserved only for order-independent (infallible) transactions. If the transaction can be invalidated or caused to revert by an action of the Sequencer, it is censorable regardless of whether it's in normal or forced-inclusion systems
> how shared sequencing exposes options for trust-minimized bridges between rollup environments
not too much. It may help users of those bridges by providing atomic inclusion guarantees. But it cannot be used to construct a bridge without some other system or trust assumption
> really off the wall, but if the above paradigm for trust-min is viable, whether it might be viable for rollups post data to multiple DA's just for wider trust-minimized bridge-ability with other chains
had a fun idea for this a looooong time ago https://www.youtube.com/watch?v=OTNjdw_XmDk